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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court's jurisdiction rests upon Utah Code Annotated Sections 78A-3-
102(3)0') and 78A-3-102(4). 
1 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
ISSUE 1: Whether the district court correctly found, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that Mr. Herbert engaged in a course of conduct of two or more acts directed at 
or toward Ms. Butters as required by Utah Code Annotated Section 76-5-106.5. 
Standard of Review. Clear error: The Appellate Court "review[s] the trial court's 
findings of fact for clear error, reversing only where [a] finding is against the clear weight 
of the evidence, or if [it] otherwise reach[es] a firm conviction that a mistake has been 
made." Ellison v. Stain, 2006 UT App. 150,1j 17, 136 P.3d 1242 (quoting ProMax Dev. 
Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah Ct.App.1997)). Further, "[i]n order to 
estabUsh that a particular finding of fact is clearly erroneous, '[a]n appellant must marshal 
the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, 
the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the 
evidence.5" Ellsworth Paulsen Const v. 51-SPR, LLC, 2006 UT App 353, ^  26, 144 P. 3d 
261 (quoting Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, f 19, 100 P.3d 1177). 
ISSUE 2: Whether the district court correctly relied on the definition of 
"emotional distress" set forth in the current stalking injunction statutes, rather than the 
outrageous and intolerable standard for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
Standard of Review, Correctness: "The proper interpretation and application of a statute 
is a question of law which [the Appellate Court] review[s] for correctness, affording no 
deference to the district court's legal conclusion^]." Ellison v. Stam, 2006 UT App 150, 
If 16,136 P.3d 1242 (quoting Gutierrez v. Medley, 972 P.2d 913, 914-15 (Utah 1998)). 
2 
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ISSUE 3: Whether the district court appropriately awarded Petitioner her 
attorneys' fees under Utah Code Annotated Section 77-3a-101(16), and should she be 
awarded her fees incurred on appeal? 
Standard of Review, Abuse of Discretion: The "calculation of reasonable attorney fees is 
in the sound discretion of the trial court, and will not be overturned in the absence of a 
showing of a clear abuse of discretion." Colonial Building Supply, LLC v. Constr. 
Assocs., Inc., 2011 UT App 149,110 (citing Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 
988 (Utah 1988)). Further, "an award of attorney fees must be supported by evidence in 
the record." Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 988. 
i 
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CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Material statutory provisions in this appeal are Utah Code Annotated Sections 77-
3a-101 and 76-5-106.5. The statutes are lengthy and included in the addenda to the Brief 
of Appellant 
4 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Procedural History 
Petitioner/Appellee Aiona Butters ("Ms. Butters") filed a request for an ex parte 
stalking injunction against Nathan Gary Herbert ("Mr. Herbert") on August 5, 2010. (R. 
15.) The request was granted on August 10, 2010. (R. 17.) Mr. Herbert requested a 
hearing, which was held on November 12 and 17, 2010. (R. 24,284-295.) After the two-
day hearing with evidence and testimony from multiple witnesses presented on both sides, 
the District Court found that the evidence and testimony supported imposing a three-year 
stalking injimction against Mr. Herbert. (R. 285.) The Honorable James Taylor signed the 
order granting the civil stalking injunction and served the same on Mr. Herbert in open 
court on November 17, 2011. (R. 285:184-185.) Mr. Herbert now appeals that decision. 
Statement of Facts 
MR. HERBERT FIRST SEES MS. BUTTERS AT RIVERWOODS IN 2004 
1. In 2004, Ms. Butters' sister, Talei Moana Weingarten Akana ("Ms. 
Akana"), spent some time socializing with Mr. Herbert, including a final incident where 
Mr. Herbert drove Ms. Akana from Utah County to Salt Lake City during a winter night 
with icy roads. As Mr. Herbert's car was sliding on the roadway, Ms. Akana pled for him 
not to take her to Salt Lake City. However, Mr. Herbert continued driving, with Ms. 
Akana crying and gripping the car. (R. 284:28.) Ms. Akana's mother had also requested 
that Mr. Herbert not drive to Salt Lake City because of road conditions. (R. 284:40.) 
2. Thereafter, in December 2004, Ms. Akana was shopping at Papaya and 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Company, a store formerly located in the Riverwoods shopping center in Provo, Utah, 
with friends and family (including Ms. Butters). Ms. Akana's mother said she saw Mr. 
Herbert outside of the store. Ms. Akana, Ms. Butters, and a friend hid in the very back of 
the store. Mr. Herbert entered the store and came straight to the hiding women. He asked 
them if they were hiding from him, and Ms. Akana said that they were hiding. This 
incidence was the first time Mr. Herbert had contact with and saw Ms. Butters. (R. 
284:28-30.) 
3. Ms. Butters specifically remembered Mr. Herbert's direct stare during the 
Riverwoods encounter. (R. 284:45.) 
MR. HERBERT INNAPROPRIATELY TOUCHES HIMSELF WHILE 
WATCHING MS. BUTTERS FROM BEHIND AT GOLD'S GYM IN THE 
WINTER OF 2004-2005 
4. After the encounter at Riverwoods, while Ms. Butters was exercising at 
Gold's Gym5 a woman approached Ms. Butters and told her that a man was watching her 
from behind and inappropriately touching himself. Ms. Butters turned around, made eye 
contact with Mr. Herbert, and saw him touching himself (his hand was on his genitals 
over his pants). Then Mr. Herbert left the area and went to the men's room. (R. 284:26-
27; 284:46-48.) 
5. Ms. Butters hoped that Mr. Herbert was doing something besides 
masturbating, such as adjusting himself for comfort. (R. 284:66.) ..' 
6. Further, Ms. Butters tried to reason in her mind that Mr. Herbert would not 
be inappropriately touching himself in public. She wanted to give him the benefit of the 
6 
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doubt and tried to forget the incident. However, she did tell Ms. Akana about the incident. 
(R. 284:48-49.) 
MR, HERBERT ASSAULTS MS. BUTTERS5 SISTER AND VIOLATES THE 
ENSUING PROTECTIVE ORDER 
7. On July 18, 2005, Mr. Herbert approached Ms. Akana while she was seated 
in her vehicle on BYU campus, yelled at her, and assaulted her (by choking and shaking 
her). (R. 284:9-10.) 
8. Ms. Akana's mother testified that Ms. Akana had a sore throat and raspy 
voice for days after the assault. (R. 284:43.) The assault was frightening for Ms. Akana's 
mother and emotionally and physically traumatic for Ms. Akana. (R. 284:43.) 
9. As a result of the assault and the history of the parties, Ms. Akana obtained 
a protective order and civil stalking injunction against Mr. Herbert ("2005 Injunction"). 
(R. 284:4; see also Addendum, Plaintiffs Exhibits 1 and 2.)1 
10. Ms. Butters was also included as a protected person on the 2005 Injunction 
as a result of the Gold's Gym incident where Mr. Herbert was watching her from behind 
while touching himself. (R. 284:4, 284:10.) 
11. Due to the 2005 assault on Ms. Akana, Mr. Herbert was also restrained 
from going on BYU campus.2 (R. 284:10.) 
1
 True and correct copies of relevant exhibits admitted into evidence at the hearing are 
included in the Addendum. Exhibits 1 and 2 admitted at the hearing (and included 
herewith) are not signed due to the 2005 case being sealed, but the parties and the court 
acknowledged that they matched the original signed copies. (R. 284:17-18, 43-44.) 
2
 During the hearing, Mr. Herbert also admitted to being banned for periods of time from 
the University Mall and from Utah Valley University. (R. 285:85.) 
7 
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12. In spite of the restraining order, Ms. Akana and her family (Ms. Butters was 
not there at the time) witnessed Mr. Herbert on BYU campus in the Harris Fine Arts 
Center in August 2005. (R. 284:14-16.) 
13. Mr. Herbert admitted to seeing Ms. Butter's and Ms. Akana's parents as 
they were coming out from a production. (R. 285:64.) 
14. Ms. Akana and her family watched Mr. Herbert go up the stairs in the 
center area, and they thought he left the building. (R. 284:12.) 
15. However, Ms. Akana and her family saw Mr. Herbert again after they 
exited the building. They saw Mr. Herbert running out of the building, apparently looking 
for them. (R. 284:14.) One of the family members with an injured leg sat on a bench by 
the exit and saw Mr. Herbert running after the rest of the family. (R. 284:27.) 
16. Ms. Akana's father confirmed that Mr. Herbert ran out of the building and 
apparently could not find Ms. Akana and her family because they were in a dark area to 
the side of the building. (R. 284:33.) 
17. Ms. Akana's mother confirmed that the family member sitting on the bench 
was unseen by Mr. Herbert and that Mr. Herbert came out of the building looking toward 
where the rest of the family had gone. (R. 284:39-40.) 
18. The 2005 Injunction against Mr. Herbert (naming Ms. Akana and Ms. 
Butters) expired March 22,2009. (R. 284:49.) 
19. For the period of the 2005 Injunction, Ms. Butters did not have any 
problems with Mr. Herbert. (R. 284:50:10.) 
8 
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MR. HERBERT DRIVES AT MS. BUTTERS AND CIRCLES MS. BUTTERS' 
CAR IN THE SMITH'S PARKING LOT 
20. Shortly after the 2005 restraining order expired on March 22, 2009, in April 
2009, Ms. Butters drove to Smith's in Orem. As she was walking into the building she 
saw Mr. Herbert driving at her very fast. He stopped his car. Then started circling Ms. 
Butters' car in his car approximately ten times for at least several minutes. (R. 284:52.) 
21. The incident made Ms. Butters "really upset" because she remembered the 
Gold's Gym incident where Mr. Herbert had been touching himself while watching her, 
and the incident where Mr. Herbert choked her sister. (R. 284:53.) She was scared by Mr. 
Herbert circling her car. (R. 284:74.) 
22. Ms. Butters called the police to report the incident, but Mr. Herbert left 
before any police arrived. (R. 284:53.) 
MR. HERBERT APPROACHES AND STARES AT MS. BUTTERS IN 
UNIVERSITY MALL PARKING LOT AT A TIME WHEN MR. HERBERT WAS 
BANNED FROM BEING AT THE UNIVERSITY MALL 
23. In July 2009, while in the parking lot at University Mall in Orem, Ms. 
Butters had her two year old and newborn with her and was trying to figure out how her 
new double stroller worked at the back of her vehicle. (R. 284:54.) 
24. Working the stroller proved difficult, and Ms. Butters called her husband 
for assistance. While continuing to work on her stroller, Ms. Butters noticed somebody 
walk to the front of her car and then down the side until he was standing just feet from 
her. Ms. Butters looked up, saw it was Mr. Herbert, and told her husband on the phone. 
Mr. Herbert then backed up, walked to the entrance of the mall, and stared at Ms. Butters 
o 
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from behind some pillars. (R. 284:55-56.) 
25. After she saw Mr. Herbert continuing to stare at her from the pillars, Ms. 
Butters threw the stroller into her car and left, without going into the mall. (R. 284:82.) 
26. Ms. Butters called the University Mall police to report Mr. Herbert's 
presence because she knew they work in conjunction with the Orem Police and because 
she knew that at least at one point Mr. Herbert was banned from the University Mall. (R. 
284:57,284:82.) 
27. The incident upset Ms. Butters. (R. 284:83.) 
MR. HERBERT APPROACHES AND STARES AT MS. BUTTERS AT THE 
OREM PUBLIC LIBRARY 
28. In January 2010, Ms. Butters was at the Orem Public Library. She felt 
somebody stand directly behind her and discovered Mr. Herbert was standing directly 
behind her in line while she was waiting to check out a book. (R. 284:57.) 
29. Mr. Herbert had a "leering" smile on his face and leaned forward towards 
Ms. Butters. She dropped her book and rushed out to her vehicle, parked directly outside 
of the hbrary entrance. She saw Mr. Herbert run out after her. Ms. Butters was shaking in 
fear as a result of the encounter. (R. 284:58, 284:85.) 
30. Ms. Butters reported the incident to the police. (R. 284:58.) 
AUGUST 4,2010 GOLD'S GYM INCIDENT 
31. On August 4,2010, Ms. Butters went to Gold's Gym to exercise and parked 
her vehicle directly in front of the building, where it was plainly visible to anyone looking 
from inside to the outside of the building. (R. 284:59.) 
10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
32. As Ms. Butters walked into the gym, Mr. Herbert walked out of the gym. 
When Mr. Herbert saw Ms. Butters he had a "glazed fixated look over his face." Ms. 
Butters told Mr. Herbert to please leave her alone. Ms. Butters continued inside the gym 
and saw Mr. Herbert circling her car on foot at least five times. (R. 284:59.) 
33. As Mr. Herbert circled Ms. Butters' car, he walked slowly and looked into 
the car' s windows. Mr. Herbert's behavior scared Ms. Butters and she went to an 
employee and asked if she could stand by him. At that point she did not scan her card, but 
was motivated to stand with an employee for protection. (R. 284:60.) 
34. Mr. Herbert re-entered the gym, walked approximately 20 feet behind Ms. 
Butters, and began pacing while staring at Ms. Butters for approximately one minute. (R. 
284:60.) 
35. Mr. Herbert's behavior scared Ms. Butters and made her feel like he was 
"raping her with his eyes." (R. 284:60-61.) 
36. The employee she had been standing with took her to the Gold's Gym 
assistant manager, Tyler Phillips. (R. 284:61; 284:149.) Mr. Phillips testified that Ms. 
Butters was "[ojbviously... in distress." (R. 284:149.) At that point Mr. Herbert walked 
over to a weight bench but continued watching Ms. Butters rather than facing the 
equipment. Then Mr. Herbert moved to an elliptical and continued watching Ms. Butters. 
Then Mr. Herbert left the gym. (R. 284:61.) Mr. Phillips saw Mr. Herbert staring at Ms. 
Butters from the weight bench and elliptical. (R. 284:150.) 
37. Ms. Butters called the police to report the incident, and they advised her to 
i i 
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come to the station to fill out a stalking injunction request. (R. 284:61.) 
38. Ms. Butters waited for a short time, because she was afraid of where Mr. 
Herbert could have been. Then she went to the Orem Police Station. (R. 284:62.) 
39. Ms. Butters requested documents and police reports to attach to the stalking 
injunction request, assuming the police would provide her with all the documentation she 
needed. (R. 284:70-71.) 
40. When Ms. Butters was at the police station, she started feeling comfort and 
protection, until she was informed that Mr. Herbert had just been at the same window at 
the police station shortly before her. She immediately started crying and shaking. The 
police escorted her to a room and arranged to have an officer move her car; they escorted 
her out of the building while Mr. Herbert was on the second floor of the building. (R. 
284:63.) 
41. Tara Calancea, the Customer Service Specialist at the Orem Police 
Department who interacted with both Ms. Butters and Mr. Herbert, said that when Ms. 
Butters learned Mr. Herbert had been at the station Ms. Butters cried "for quite a few 
minutes" and that she "had never seen someone that upset before . . . . " (R. 284:119.) 
42. Ms. Calancea found Mr. Herbert's behavior at the station strange: she was 
surprised Mr. Herbert would come to the station purportedly to resolve a parking ticket 
that had already been resolved; an issue that normally takes five minutes to resolve took 
over an hour for Mr. Herbert; and Mr. Herbert seemed very distracted, repeatedly looking 
12 
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around, listening in, needing the same question answered multiple times.3 (R. 284:113; 
284:117; 284:120-122.) 
43. After Mr. Herbert was done discussing his ticket with Ms. Calancea, Mr. 
Herbert milled around the police station, going into some rooms, and wandering up and 
down the hallway. (R. 284:122; 284:123.) 
44. Ms. Calancea left for her lunch after interacting with Mr. Herbert and Ms. 
Butters. When Ms. Calancea returned she saw Mr. Herbert walking up and down the rows 
of cars. At least three hours had passed from the time that Mr. Herbert had first come to 
the police station to the time Ms. Calancea saw Mr. Herbert in the parking lot. (R. 
284:124.) 
45. Ms. Butters filed the restraining order against Mr. Herbert the next day, 
August 5, 2010. (R. 284:63.) 
AUGUST 11, 2010 GOLD'S GYM INCIDENT 
46. Ms. Butters waited approximately a week before she went back to the gym. 
She took the stalking injunction with her to notify Gold's Gym that Mr. Herbert was not 
allowed at that location. (R. 284:63-64.) 
3
 In testimony that went un-contradicted by Mr. Herbert, Ms. Calancea testified as to a 
separate event. She and her 4-year-old son were in the restroom in Cold Stone at the 
University Mall shortly before the hearing took place. The restroom door would not lock, 
so she was standing next to the door while her son used the toilet. Suddenly Mr. Herbert 
came bursting into the room holding his crotch, claiming he needed to use the restroom. 
She requested he leave the room, and he ran out the door. (R. 284:125-126) Ms. Calancea 
said she "was surprised by a lot of things [Mr. Herbert] just flung the door wide open 
as he entered. He was a grown man holding himself, that surprised me." (R. 284:133.) 
n 
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47. Ms. Butters felt safe enough to exercise after providing the stalking 
injunction. However, when she was about to leave, she was informed that Mr. Herbert 
had been at the gym for the entire time that Ms. Butters had been there. Then Ms. Butters 
saw Mr. Herbert come out of the manager's office. When he exited the building, he 
turned around and stared in at the entrance where Ms. Butters was standing. (R. 284:64.) 
48. Mr. Josh Workman of the Governor's security detail who accompanied Mr. 
Herbert that day noted that the incident caused Ms. Butters to be visibly upset. (R. 
284:218.) 
14 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly found that Mr. Herbert engaged in a course of conduct 
sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirements for a civil stalking injunction. The trial 
court specifically found five incidents to support the fact that Mr. Herbert approached, 
monitored, observed, or confronted Ms. Butters. In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Herbert 
attempts to marshal the evidence by omitting or mischaracterizing testimony and 
distorting the facts as established by the evidence. As such, Mr. Herbert's efforts fail and 
this Court should deny the relief he seeks. 
Further, the trial court, which is in the best position to assess testimony and 
evidence as presented by the parties, supported its findings with a detailed assessment of 
every incident between the parties. The trial court found some of the evidence in favor of 
both parties, but ruled that Ms. Butters was more credible than Mr. Herbert. As such, 
under parts (a) and (b) of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5(2), Ms. Butters met her burden by 
a preponderance of the evidence. 
The issue of outrageous and intolerable conduct being the emotional distress 
standard for a stalking injunction was not preserved by Mr. Herbert at trial. And it does 
not constitute the correct legal standard, as the stalking injunction statute itself provides a 
definition for "emotional distress." 
Finally, the trial court also correctly applied the provision for attorney's fees. Mr. 
Herbert cites the rule, but fails to address the issue in any substantive manner. He simply 
opposes Ms. Butters being awarded her fees, as any losing party does. 
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Thus, this Court should affirm the stalking injunction at issue, affirm the award of 
attorneys' fees, and award Ms. Butters her attorney's fees and costs incurred on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. MR. HERBERT FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE. 
The Brief of Appellant fails to appropriately marshal the evidence sufficient to 
support a reversal of the trial court's ruling. The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
require "[a] party challenging a fact finding [to] first marshal all record evidence that 
supports the challenged finding." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). The marshaling requirement 
is "not intended to gratuitously oppress an appellant; rather it exists to facilitate a 
structured, realistic, and skeptical appraisal of facts without unduly compromising the 
adversarial process." In the Matter ofE.H.v. R.C andS.C, 2006 UT 36, If 64, 137P.3d 
809. At its core, the "duty to marshal evidence contemplates that an appellant present 
every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the 
appellant resists and then ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence, becoming a devil's 
advocate." Id. (internal citation and quotations omitted). "In sum, to properly marshal the 
evidence the challenging party must demonstrate how the court found the facts from the 
evidence and then explain why those findings contradict the clear weight of the 
evidence." United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Foods, 2006 UT 
35, f 26,140 P.3d 1200 (internal citation omitted). 
Finally, the Supreme Court has "repeatedly... warned of the grim consequences 
parties face when they fail to fulfill the marshaling requirement." Id. at f 27. When an 
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appellant fails to perform this "critical task," the Court "rel[ies] on that failure to affirm 
the lower court's findings of fact." Id; see also In the Matter ofE.K, 2006 UT 36, f 65; 
Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 2007 UT 42, f 19, 164 P.3d 384 ("[P]arties that fail 
to marshal the evidence do so at the risk that the reviewing court will decline, in its 
discretion, to review the trial court's factual findings.5'). 
In this appeal, Mr. Herbert has failed to marshal the evidence, and he failed to 
show how the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the District Court's 
finding, is insufficient. His arguments include conclusory statements that the evidence 
was legally insufficient to support the trial court's finding that Mr. Herbert engaged in a 
course of conduct directed at Ms. Butters. 
Further, in his "statement of facts," Mr. Herbert repeatedly failed to identify 
damning testimony and evidence. For example, Mr. Herbert omitted or distorted a 
significant amount of testimony and evidence.4 While Mr. Herbert acknowledges that Ms. 
Butters first saw Mr. Herbert when he came into the store at Riverwoods, he fails to note 
that the incident was the first time he saw Ms. Butters as well. In fact, Ms. Akana testified 
that she hid with Ms. Butters at the back of the store and that Mr. Herbert came straight to 
them. (R. 284:29.) Further, Ms. Butters testified that he "was looking directly at us." (R. 
284:45.) The fact that Ms. Butters testified that Mr. Herbert did not enter the store to talk 
4
 The Factual History section of the Brief of Appellant Nathan Gary Herbert (Appellant's 
Brief, at 3-8) contains no citations to the record but includes numerous misrepresentations 
of testimony and evidence. The Statement of Facts section appears to retain the same 
inaccuracies. As such, Ms. Butters' cites only to those inaccuracies that Mr. Herbert 
claims to be supported by the record. 
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with or interact with Ms. Butters does not change the fact that Mr. Herbert saw Ms. 
Butters. (R. 284:65.) 
Likewise, Mr. Herbert fails to note that in the Gold's Gym incident in the winter of 
2004-2005, not only did a third party female tell Ms. Butters that a man was watching Ms. 
Butters from behind and inappropriately touching himself, but Ms. Butters turned around, 
made eye contact with Mr. Herbert, saw Mr. Herbert's hands on his genitals, and at the 
moment Mr. Herbert saw that Ms. Butters had seen him, he went straight into the men's 
room. (R. 284:48.) Further, Mr. Herbert characterizes Ms. Butters' testimony as an 
admission that it was very possible that Mr. Herbert was simply adjusting himself or 
getting comfortable. (Appellant's Brief at 9.) However, Ms. Butters qualified that 
admission stating that she "hope[d]" Mr. Herbert was adjusting himself. (R. 284:66.) 
Mr. Herbert attempts to demonstrate a contradiction in Ms. Butters' testimony with 
respect to the Smith's incident in April 2009. (Appellant's Brief at 11.) No contradictions 
exist. The clearest evidence regarding Ms. Butters' parking space was an aerial 
photograph where Ms. Butters marked her spot with an "A" and circled it. (R. 285:89; see 
also Addendum, Defendant's Exhibit 9.) Prior to marking her space on the aerial 
photograph, Ms. Butters testified she "was parked in an end spot and there was an empty 
space next to me " (R. 284:71.) Further, Ms. Butters testified "there was no parking 
space in front of me. At the very, very, very end [of her row] toward the road [in front of 
Smith's] it's just one row of cars and mine was at the very, very end of that particular 
parking stall and there was not a car parked right next to me " (R. 284:72.) 
18 
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Ms. Butters' testimony is entirely consistent with the aerial photograph. Ms. 
Butters also drew a picture of her recollection of the parking lot (Addendum, Defendant's 
Exhibit 4) and testified regarding the drawing, which while consistent, the drawing and 
testimony are not as clear as the testimony regarding the actual aerial photograph. (R. 
284:72-73.) Mr. Herbert appears to confuse Ms. Butters' usage of the road in front of the 
Smith's entrance with the perpendicular Orem Center Street outside of the parking lot. 
However, the Smith's store manager, Ms. Jane Becker, confirmed that there were no 
obstructions that would have prevented Mr. Herbert from driving around Ms. Butters' car 
as she had described. (R. 285:8.) 
Mr. Herbert also distorts Ms. Butters' testimony regarding her reporting the 
Smith's incident to the police. Ms. Butters testified she was crying and shaking in fear as 
a result of Mr. Herbert driving around her car repeatedly. (R. 284:75-76.) Ms. Butters 
called the police to report the incident. (R. 284:75.) However, the police called Ms. 
Butters back by the time she was at home. (R. 284:76.) Even though she was at home, Ms. 
Butters was still shaking and crying, but by that time she was not so uncontrollable that 
the police had to ask her to calm down, and thus the conversation with the police "wasn't 
that dramatic." (R. 284:76.) Mr. Herbert mischaracterizes Ms. Butters' testimony. He 
attempts to associate the specific line of questioning about reporting an incident after the 
fact from home as being not "that dramatic" (Appellant's Brief at 11) with the entire 
Smith's incident, which was clearly very frightening and distressing to Ms. Butters. It is 
reasonable that after the fact, in a conversation with the police from her home, that Ms. 
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Butters, while shaking and crying, could retain enough composure that the police would 
not need to ask her to calm down. 
Mr. Herbert's failure to accurately represent testimony and evidence demonstrates 
a failure to meet the marshaling requirement. As such, his requests for relief should be 
denied. 
H. THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE DISTRICT COURT'S ENTERING THE 
CIVIL STALKING INJUNCTION. 
A. The trial court observed the parties and many witnesses during the 
two-day hearing and made detailed findings of fact evaluating each 
confrontation between the parties in support of its decision. 
At the threshold, there is no doubt the trial court was in the best position to assess 
the demeanor and posture of the parties and other witnesses during the two-day hearing. 
In fact, the trial court made specific findings as to each party's behavior. The trial court 
noted its duty to "candidly and forthrightly evaluate the credibility of some of the 
witnesses and that [it] make some specific findings." (R. 285:143.) 
i. Ms. Butters' testimony was reliable and credible. 
The trial court found Ms. Butters' testimony reasonably credible. (R. 285:144.) 
Specifically, the trial noted, "I have watched Mrs. Butters in this case, her appearance in 
court has been reasonably credible. I haven't discerned an unreasonable attempt to stretch 
or overstate her memory. Certainly with every witness she remembers some details, she 
doesn't remember others but in general I found her presentation to be credible and 
reasonable." (R. 285:144.) The trial court also found Ms. Butters to be "more emotional 
than the usual person that comes to court and . . . that she is not an accurate evaluator of 
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distance or time . . . . [S]he is influenced by fears and concerns that her mother and the 
rest of her family have." (R. 295:143-144.) 
ii. Mr, Herbert's demeanor appeared arrogant and his testimony was 
unreliable and minimized or exaggerated where convenient 
The trial court made several findings as to Mr. Herbert's unfavorable demeanor 
and unbelievable testimony. The court found that Mr. Herbert's "posture while sitting at 
the table and at the witness stand tends to create an impression of arrogance." (R. 
285:144.) These observations reflect the importance of the trial court's evaluating 
testimony in person and why the standard of review for such findings is that of clear error. 
The trial court also observed that Mr. Herbert has a "direct and almost unblinking and 
intense stare . . . ." (R. 285:144.) Mr. Herbert's stare was the subject of many of the 
encounters with Ms. Butters and Mr. Herbert, and it is important that the trial court 
observed that simple "fact" as it indicates the reliability of Ms. Butters testimony. (R. 
285:144.) 
In addition, the trial court found that Mr. Herbert's "memory and testimony of 
specific events . . . minimized or exaggerated when convenient." (R. 285:145.) By way of 
illustration, at the hearing, there was evidence that Mr. Herbert pled guilty to disorderly 
conduct for lewd behavior [unrelated to Ms. Butters] in University Mall in February 2004. 
(R. 284:174, 284:180, 285:69.) The trial court noted that "Mr. Crabb's testimony of the 
nature and circumstances of the interview [at University Mall] with Mr. Herbert was 
credible and was consistent with [Mr. Herbert's] recollection of the events. [However, 
Mr. Herbert's] recollection, his testimony about that event.. . minimized and 
11 
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contradicted Officer Crabb's credible testimony specifically about Mr. Herbert's 
confession." (R. 285:145.) Contrary to Mr. Herbert's testimony, it was apparent to the 
trial court that Mr. Herbert "knew the . . . specific nature of the allegations [against him]" 
(R. 285:146) and that he confessed to Mr. Crabb that he was "masturbating in his pants" 
or, in Mr. Herbert's terminology (according to Mr. Crabb) that Mr. Herbert confessed "he 
was playing with his penis" in Nordstrom while watching a female employee work. (R. 
284:177-178.)5 
Mr. Herbert and Ms. Butters' testimony conflicted as to whether Mr. Herbert saw 
Ms. Butters in the Riverwoods encounter. {Compare R. 285:23 with R. 284:45.) The trial 
court found that "it was credible that there, in fact, was a confrontation [with Mr. Herbert 
and Ms. Butters' family and ] . . . they were afraid. They had seen Mr. Herbert. It was 
obvious that they were avoiding him and they were hiding at the back of the store. He 
confronted them directly and said, ["]Are you hiding[?"]. It is incredible that he didn't 
observe or note the presence of [Ms.] Butters, particularly given that later in other 
circumstances he quickly recognize[d] and identified her as a sister and member of the 
family." (R. 285:146.) The trial court also noted that during the Riverwoods confrontation 
Mr. Herbert "was aware of the family including [Ms. Butters]. He directly confronted 
5
 While the Court did not highlight it specifically, Mr. Crabb testified that Mr. Herbert 
knew Mr. Crabb was "coming [towards Mr. Herbert] and that [Mr. Herbert] was 
attempting to get away... [with Mr. Crabb] on a dead run" behind him. (R. 284: 177). 
On the other hand, Mr. Herbert testified that he "kind of scampered through the food 
court and kind of got out of there [after seeing the officer approach him]." (R. 285:34.) 
Mr. Herbert's self-serving minimization of his conduct is consistent with the trial court's 
findings. 
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them while they were cowering in the back of the store, attempting to avoid him.5' (R. 
285:148.) 
The trial court also found to a preponderance regarding the Gold's Gym incident in 
the winter of 2004-2005, that Mr. Herbert "was intently watching [Ms.] Butters while she 
exercised and that he was watching in a posture which could reasonably have been 
interpreted to be conduct similar to the accusations from University Mall." The trial court 
made no finding of any lewd act in the University Mall incident, but the trial court noted 
that Mr. Herbert "should have know[n] the nature of the accusations from the mall and 
avoided being placed in a circumstance where he could be accused of committing the 
same kind of conduct." (R. 285:148.) Again, the trial court's finding is supported by the 
evidence. 
The trial court also specifically found that Mr. Herbert's testimony about the 
assault on BYU campus "minimized the nature of that circumstance." (R. 285:146.) Mr. 
Herbert testified he touched Ms. Akana's shoulders as "kind of a pretend shake." (R. 
285:31.) Ms. Akana testified Mr. Herbert choked her and "put both his hands around [her] 
neck and he just started shaking [her]." (R. 284:9.) Mr. Herbert was charged with assault 
and restrained from going on BYU campus as a result of the incident. (R. 284:10; R. 
285:72-75.) Mr. Herbert claimed the assault charge was "just dismissed." (R. 285:48.) In 
fact, Mr. Herbert entered a guilty plea in abeyance wherein the assault charges were 
dismissed if Mr. Herbert pled guilty to the violation of the injunction. (R. 285:72-75; see 
also Addendum, Plaintiffs Exhibit 10.) Again, the court's finding is supported by the 
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evidence. (R. 284:4, 284:10.) 
Mr. Herbert claimed not to know or recognize Ms. Butters until after August 2008, 
well after the 2005 Injunction issued. (R. 285:22-23, 285:40.) However, Mr. Herbert still 
had a copy of the 2005 stalking injunction in his car in August 2011. (R. 285:61.) The 
trial court found that Mr. Herbert's "memory of the specific restraining order that he 
stipulated to is not credible. It's just simply not believable that [Ms.] Butters would have 
been a specifically named respondent and that he would not have been able to recognize 
her and made it his business to recognize her because the consequence of violating an 
order like that are significant and serious. It isn't believable that he would still have it in 
his possession years later and have no knowledge or acquaintance with [Ms.] Butters." 
(R. 284:147.) 
Mr. Herbert also acknowledged that he violated the 2005 Injunction and order 
banning him from BYU (as a result of the assault) because he had "pre-purchased tickets 
to this event and [he] wanted to see it." (R. 285:65.) The trial court noted that the incident 
was "only relevant to this case to the extent that it demonstrates credibility to his conduct. 
He specifically knew of the restraining order and intentionally violated the order and did 
so . . . with a casual attitude reflected in his testimony...." (R. 285:147.) 
In light of the trial court's observation of the testimony and demeanor of the 
witnesses and its specific findings afterward, the trial court's ruling should be affirmed. 
B. The trial court's findings support a stalking injunction against Mr. 
Herbert under U.C.A. §76-5-106.5(2)(a) and (b). 
The trial court appropriately considered and weighed the evidence before it and 
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concluded that a civil stalking injunction was appropriate. A civil stalking injunction is 
available when a petitioner proves "by a preponderance of the evidence that stalking of 
the petitioner by the respondent occurred." Utah Code. Ann. § 77-3a-101(7). Stalking is 
defined in the civil context the same as in the criminal context. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-
3a-101(1). In relevant part and in the criminal context, a person commits stalking if he 
"intentionally and knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person 
and knows or should know that the course of conduct would case a reasonable person: (a) 
to fear for the person's own safety or the safety of a third person; or (b) to suffer other 
emotional distress." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5(2). A "course of conduct" is defined as 
two or more acts directed at or toward a specific person, including: 
(i) acts in which the actor follows, monitors, observes, photographs, 
serveils, threatens, or communicates to or about a person, or interferes with 
a person's property: 
(A) directly, indirectly, or through any third party; and 
(B) by any action, method, device, or means; or 
(ii) when the actor engages in any of the following acts or causes someone 
else to engage in any of these acts: 
(A) approaches or confronts a person" and other inapplicable 
actions. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5(1 )(b). A "reasonable person" means "a reasonable person 
in the victim's circumstances." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5(l)(e). And emotional 
distress means "significant mental or psychological suffering, whether or not medical or 
other professional treatment or counseling is required." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
106.5(l)(d). 
Applying the statute to the case at hand requires statutory interpretation. In 
considering the apphcation of this statute to a specific stalking case, this Court has clearly 
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stated that the "goal when confronted with questions of statutory interpretation is to 
evince the true intent and purpose of the Legislature." Bott v. Osburn, 2011 UT App 139, 
\ 85 257 P.3d 1022 (internal citations omitted). Further, it "is axiomatic that the best 
evidence of legislative intent is the plain language of the statute itself." Id. By way of 
illustration,"[l]ooking to the plain language" of the statute reveals that, while establishing 
the elements of stalking requires the trial court finding that the alleged stalker had the 
intent to engage in a course of conduct that he knew or should have known would a cause 
a reasonable person to fear or suffer emotional distress, "there is no requirement that the 
trial court also find that the victim was actually afraid or distressed." Id. "Thus, the statute 
is plain on its face and no further analysis is necessary to discern the legislature's intent." 
Id. In addition, "[s]talking, by its very nature, is an offense of repetition," the "conduct is 
rendered... more threatening because it is repeated" and should not be considered in a 
vacuum; rather, the conduct at issue should be considered cumulatively "in the context of 
the facts and circumstances of the individual case." Ellison v. Stam, 2006 UT App 150, fflf 
25-33, 136 P.3d 1242. 
The trial court found that "when Mr. Herbert took the actions he did, he did so 
knowingly and intentionally. There's no evidence that he did anything [b]y mistake or that 
this was thoughtless action." (R. 285:150.) For example, the trial court found that, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, Mr. Herbert directly confronted Ms. Butters as he "drove 
directly at her and he deliberately circled her vehicle in a confrontive manner." (R. 
285:148.) Similarly, in the University Mall parking lot incident in 2009, the court found it 
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credible that Ms. Butters would have called University Mall security (as she was a former 
employee of Nordstrom) and because she knew there was a restraining order directing 
him to stay away from the mall. (R. 285:149.) Again, to a preponderance, the trial court 
found Mr. Herbert's actions reflect that Mr. Herbert walked directly to Ms. Butters, stood 
in close proximity, and then continued to watch her from a distance. (R. 285:149.) 
In sum, the trial court found five incidents sustained by the evidence that Mr. 
Herbert approached, monitored, observed, or confronted Ms. Butters directly: (1) the 
confrontation at Riverwoods, (2) the Gold's Gym incident in 2004-2005, (3) the Smith's 
incident on April 2009, (4) the University Mall incident in July 2009, and (5) the Gold's 
Gym incident on August 4, 2010. (R. 285:150.) The trial court also noted that "given the 
history of [Mr. Herbert's] problems at the [University] Mall and the prior orders and 
confrontations with the family,... the evidence reasonably establishes that he did know 
and recognize [Ms.] Butters and that he knew or should have known that the conduct 
would cause a reasonable person in those circumstances to suffer emotional distress." (R. 
285:150-151.) The combined effect of these incidents, and other reliable evidence, 
justifies the stelking injunction at issue. 
The five incidents sustained by the evidence demonstrate that Mr. Herbert's 
conduct would not only cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress under the 
circumstances, but also cause a reasonable person to fear for the person's own safety. 
Throughout the two-day hearing the evidence spoke to both prongs of Utah Code 
Annotated Section § 76-5-106.5(2), and in Ms. Butter's closing her counsel argued that 
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both standards applied. (R. 285:103-104.) As the trial court explicitly, stated that Mr. 
Herbert knew or should have known his conduct would cause a reasonable person to 
suffer emotional distress, or Utah Code Annotated Section 76-5-106.5(2)(b), this section 
will address the emotional distress aspect before addressing the fear for safety aspect of 
Utah Code Annotated Section 76-5-106.5(2)(a). 
z. Mr. Herbert's actions and the trial court's findings support a civil 
stalking injunction under U.C.A. §76-5-106.5(2)(b). 
As noted above, under the stalking injunction statute, emotional distress means 
"significant mental or psychological suffering, whether or not medical or other 
professional treatment or counseling is required." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5(l)(d). 
The definition requires no interpretation. As highlighted in the facts section, the record is 
full of instances where Ms. Butters indicated she experienced emotional distress and 
many other witnesses identified the same emotional distress. 
The Smith's incident made Ms. Butters "really upset" because she remembered the 
Gold's Gym incident where Mr. Herbert had been touching himself while watching her, 
and the incident where Mr. Herbert choked her sister. (R. 284:53.) She was scared by Mr. 
Herbert circling her car. (R. 284:74.) Ms. Butters testified she was crying and shaking in 
fear as a result of Mr. Herbert driving around her car repeatedly. (R. 284:75.) 
In the University Mall parking lot incident upset Ms. Butters. (R. 284:83.) Ms. 
Butters noted that "every time there is an incident with [Mr. Herbert] I . . . need some 
emotional support " (R. 284:82.) The Orem Library incident made Ms. Butters shake 
in fear. (R. 284:58,284:85.) 
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The August 4 Gold's Gym incident was particularly distressing. When she was 
walking in and he was walking out she said, "Please leave me alone." (R. 284:91.) Mr. 
Herbert's circling her car on foot scared Ms. Butters, and she went to an employee and 
asked if she could stand by him. (R. 284:60.) She repeatedly told the employee that she 
was scared. (R. 284:94-95.) Mr. Phillips, another employee testified that Ms. Butters was 
"[o]bviously... in distress." (R. 284:149.) When Mr. Herbert paced behind her and 
stared, Mr. Herbert's behavior scared Ms. Butters and made her feel like he was "raping 
her with his eyes." (R. 284:60-61.) Clearly Ms. Butters was emotionally distressed and 
that distress continued at the police station. Tara Calancea, the Customer Service 
Specialist at the Orem Police Department who interacted with both Ms. Butters and Mr. 
Herbert, said that when Ms. Butters learned Mr. Herbert had been at the station Ms. 
Butters cried "for quite a few minutes" and that she "had never seen someone that upset 
before...." (R. 284:119.) 
As the trial court found, the actions directed by Mr. Herbert towards Ms. Butters, 
coupled with the history of the parties prior to the stalking incidents, would cause a 
reasonable person in Ms. Butters' shoes to experience significant mental or psychological 
suffering, or emotional distress. 
ii. Mr. Herbert's actions and the trial court's findings support a civil 
stalking injunction under U.C.A. §76-5-106.5(2)(a). 
Ms. Butters also feared for her safety many times as a result of her encounters with 
Mr. Herbert. When considering whether a reasonable person would fear for his safety, it 
is not necessary that "each act or incident independently be such as to cause a reasonable 
o n 
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person to fear for his or her safety; rather, it is the pattern of behavior or the course of 
conduct considered in the context of the circumstances that must have that cumulative 
effect." Coombs v. Dietrich, 2011 UT App 136,1 13, 253 P.3d 1121. 
Again, the record is full of examples where Ms. Butters and others testify as to Ms. 
Butters fear for her own safety. Each incident cited directly above reflect incidents where 
Ms. Butters feared for her safety. In addition, Ms. Butters clearly testified that Mr. 
Herbert's actions made her feel scared, invaded, and intimidated. (R. 284:87.) Ms. Butters 
also acknowledged that her greatest fear was that she or another victim would end up 
dead. (R. 284:88.) Even Mr. Workman, the Governor's security detail, testified that he 
heard Ms. Butters tell the police that she was scared she would "end up in a ditch." (R. 
285:13.) 
Ms. Butters was aware of the Nordstrom's masturbation incident that resulted in 
Mr. Herbert's banishment from University Mall. (R. 285:40.) She knew Mr. Herbert was 
behind her in the Gold's Gym in 2004 when he allegedly touched himself inappropriately 
while watching her intently. (R. 284:26-27; 284:46-48.) She had been named on a 
stalking injunction against Mr. Herbert before. (R. 284:4.) The encounters with Mr. 
Herbert were escalating from driving around her car, to staring at her in a parking lot, to 
circling her car on foot, to pacing behind her. When he paced behind her and stared, it 
made her feel like he was "raping her with his eyes." (R. 284:60-61.) Mr. Herbert made 
Ms. Butters felt like she would be hurt or killed. And a reasonable person in her shoes 
would have felt the same fear. The stalking injunction is justified. 
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in. MR. HERBERT DID NOT RAISE OR PRESERVE HIS OBJECTION AS 
TO THE APPLICABILITY OF THE OUTRAGEOUS AND 
INTOLERABLE STANDARD IN THE TRIAL COURT, AND, IN ANY 
CASE, THE OUTRAGEOUS AND INTOLERABLE TORT STANDARD IS 
INAPPLICABLE TO THE UTAH STALKING STATUTE. 
Mr. Herbert failed to indicate his objection to the legal standard used by the trial 
court and therefore failed to preserve the issue for appeal. For the first time, on appeal, 
Mr. Herbert argues that the trial court should have used the definition of "emotional 
distress" utilized by Utah courts in assessing a claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. The general rule is that "issues not raised at trial cannot be argued for 
the first time on appeal." Burleigh v. Friel, 2005 UT App 358, If 6, 121 P.3d 51 (citing 
Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996)). In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. 
Herbert cites to R. 286:9 (oral argument on February 25,2011 regarding attorney's fees), 
as grounds for preserving the issue of the outrageous and intolerable standard for the case 
at hand. (Appellant's Brief at 1.) At best, at that point in the record, Mr. Herbert's counsel 
made an assertion that Ms. Butters was less than reliable and that Mr. Herbert contested 
the stalking injunction. (R. 286:9.) This vague and inapplicable oral argument does not 
have anything to do with preserving the an objection to the legal standards applicable to a 
stalking injunction. If this Court is to find that Mr. Herbert preserved any issues for 
appeal with such vague argument, then the Court is creating precedent to allow almost 
any issue to be preserved with the most insignificant reference below. 
Further, there was no argument as to the outrageous and intolerable standard 
during the two-day hearing. The parties and the trial court correctly relied on the plain 
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meaning of the statute. 
Even if this Court concludes that the issue was preserved, the definition of 
"emotional distress" is contained within the stalking injunction statute, and there is no 
need, as Mr. Herbert argues, to look to other legal definitions. 
Specifically, there is no reason to look to tort law for the definition of a term that is 
explicitly defined by statute. Mr. Herbert argues that the legislative intent of the 2008 
statute indicates that the legislature intended to utilize the tort definition of emotional 
distress in the statute. However, as the Bott court aptly noted, it "is axiomatic that the best 
evidence of legislative intent is the plain language of the statute itself." Bott v. Osburn, 
2011 UT App 139, Tj 8, 257 P.3d 1022 (internal citations omitted). The plain language 
could not be plainer: "emotional distress," as clearly defined in the stalking injunction 
statute, means "significant mental or psychological suffering, whether or not medical or 
other professional treatment or counseling is required." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
106.5(l)(d). The legislature chose a specific definition of "emotional distress." The trial 
court correctly used that definition in evaluating Ms. Butters's application for a stalking 
injunction. If successful, Mr. Herbert's argument would amount to eliminating a clearly 
defined term in favor of a definition that contradicts the plain wording of the statute. Such 
result is untenable. 
Further, the statute requires a "course of conduct [that] would case a reasonable 
person: (a) to fear for the person's own safety or the safety of a third person; or (b) to 
suffer other emotional distress." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5(2) (emphasis added). The 
32 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
statute plainly states that a person's fearing for his or her own safety, or that of a third 
person, is one type of emotional distress that justifies a stalking injunction. "Other" forms 
of emotional distress also justify a stalking injunction. 
Mr. Herbert's argument cuts against a plain reading of the statute because the tort 
definition of emotional distress would not include all types of a person's fearing for his or 
her own safety or that of a third person, except in extreme circumstances. Clearly the case 
law interpreting the statute (discussed in greater detail below) does not require the tort 
definition in its application of fear for safety as justification for a stalking injunction. See, 
e.g., Coombs v. Dietrich, 2011 UT App 136. If Mr. Herbert's argument about the tort 
definition were correct, then the entire first prong of the statute regarding fear for safety 
would be subsumed in the second prong for emotional distress. Simply stated, the statute 
does not require the tort definition in its application of emotional distress. 
The case law Mr. Herbert relies upon does not justify Ms position that the 
outrageous and intolerable standard is applicable. In fact, the cases cited in his brief 
which involve stalking do not support his position, largely because the legislature 
modified the stalking injunction statute in 2008 and included a specific definition of 
"emotional distress." For example, Mr. Herbert cites to Allen v. Anger, 2011 UT App 19, 
248 P.3d 1001, as support for applying the tort definition. However, the Allen court 
specifically notes that whether the Lopez standard is overruled by the explicit definition in 
the 2008 statute "and whether it would be effective in doing so, are questions beyond the 
scope of today's decision." Allen, 2011 UT App 19 at \ 16, n.4. 
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Further, in another case cited by Mr. Herbert, this Court noted that "it recently 
acknowledged that, due to recent amendments to the Stalking Statute, the emotional 
distress requirement may have changed." Coombs v. Dietrich, 2011 UT App 136, f^ 11 
n.2, 253 P.3d 1121 (citing Allen, 2011 UT App 19 at If 16, n.4). However in Coombs, the 
decision was "based on the fear for safety provision of the Stalking Statute, [not the 
emotional distress provision, so the Court did] not reach that issue." Id. 
The other stalking case Mr. Herbert relies upon is Wallace v. Van Pelt, 969 S.W.2d 
380 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). Wallace is neither instructive nor binding precedent, as it relies 
on a different statutory scheme and judiciary precedent, and should be disregarded. 
Mr. Herbert also argues that it is plain error not to apply the outrageous and 
intolerable standard to the emotional distress in the stalking statute as referenced in Salt 
Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). The Utah Rules of Evidence 
provide that a "court may take notice of a plain error affecting a substantial right, even if 
the claim of error was not properly preserved." Utah R. Evid. 103(e). "The first 
requirement for a finding of plain error is that the error be 'plain,5 i.e., from [the Court's] 
examination of the record, [it] must be able to say that it should have been obvious to a 
trial court that it was committing error.5' State v. Eldredge, 111 P. 2d 29, 35 (Utah 1989) 
(internal citation omitted). "The second and somewhat interrelated requirement for a 
finding of plain error is that the error affect the substantial rights of the accused, i.e., that 
the error be harmful." Id. 
This Court has previously touched on the precise issue Mr. Herbert raises. The 
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party appealing a stalking injunction in Bott argued "that [this Court's] decisions in Salt 
Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), and its progeny hold that [the 
alleged stalker's] conduct must be outrageous in order to satisfy the emotional distress 
prong of the stalking statute and that the trial court could not make such a finding based 
on [the alleged stalker's] conduct [in that case]." Bott v. Osbum, 2011 UT App 139, ^18. 
The Lopez court explained that the "[e]motional distress results from conduct that is 
outrageous and intolerable in that it offends the generally accepted standards of decency 
and morality." Lopez, 935 P.2d at 1264 (internal quotation omitted). However, "the Lopez 
court looked to tort law to define 'emotional distress' because the prior version of the 
stalking statute did not contain a definition for that term." Bott, 2011 UT App 139 at ^ [18; 
compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5 (2003) with Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5 (2008). 
"The Utah appellate courts have not yet had occasion to decide whether Lopez is still 
relevant in light of the legislature's subsequent adoption of a statutory definition of 
emotional distress." Bott, 2011 UT App 139 at If 18. 
However, this Court did not leave us in the dark as to which way the wind is 
blowing as to the emotional distress standard. For example, this Court stated that "even if 
the language of the criminal stalking statute left us with doubt as to the current elements 
of stalking, the fact that the legislature deleted the language imposing a requirement that 
the defendant's conduct actually induce fear or cause emotional distress can mean 
nothing but that the legislature's purpose deliberately was to remove the requirement" 
Id. at \ 9 (emphasis added). Further, "[w]hen the legislature undertakes to amend a 
1C 
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statute, it indicates a legislative intent to change the law.5' Id. (internal citation omitted). 
Similarly, if the legislature added a definition of emotional distress in the statute, it 
indicates a legislative intent to change the law. 
Thus the Bott court's reasoning suggests that relying on the specifically defined 
term in the 2008 statute is reasonable, and not indicative that the trial court committed 
error. As such, the plain error standard is not met. 
Finally, from a policy perspective Mr. Herbert's position fails. It makes no sense to 
apply the definition of emotional distress from its use in intentional torts (which focuses 
on the intent of the tortfeasor) and apply it to the subjective standard of a reasonable 
person walking in the stalking victim's shoes. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED ITS DISCRETION IN 
AWARDING REASONABLE ATTORNEYS' FEES INCURRED BY MS. 
BUTTERS IN THIS MATTER. 
The trial court awarded Ms. Butters her costs and attorney's fees associated in 
bringing the action, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 77-3a-101(16). (R. 
285:151; see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-3a-101(16) ("After a hearing with notice to the 
affected party, the court may enter an order requiring any party to pay the costs of the 
action, including reasonable attorney fees.").) 
Under Utah law, attorney fees are awardable only if authorized by statute or by 
contract. See Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730, 734 (Utah 1985). 
Awarding attorney's fees is clearly authorized by statute after a hearing on a civil stalking 
injunction. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-3a-101(16). Notably, the statute does not require a 
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party to prevail at the hearing in order to be awarded costs or fees. Rather, the standard 
appears entirely discretionary. 
In this case, the trial court specifically found that Ms. Butters prevailed by a 
preponderance of the evidence. (R. 285:151.) The trial court also found Ms. Butters 
"appearance in court was reasonably credible/' while Mr. Herbert's appearance was 
arrogant and his testimony "minimi zed or exaggerated when convenient." (R. 285:144-
145.) Further, as support for the award, the trial court provided a detailed oral ruling, 
discussing various witnesses and their respective testimony and virtually all evidence 
presented over the two-day hearing. (R. 285:143-152.) In fact, the trial court specifically 
reviewed each event when Ms. Butters and Mr. Herbert crossed paths and found that Mr. 
Herbert's actions were knowing and intentional and justified the stalking injunction at 
issue. (R. 285:150.) 
As noted earlier; the trial court found that five incidents sustained by the evidence 
that Mr. Herbert approached, monitored, observed, or confronted Ms. Butters directly: (1) 
the confrontation at Riverwoods, (2) the Gold's Gym incident in 2004-2005, (3) the 
Smith's incident on April 2009, (4) the University Mall incident in My 2009, and (5) the 
Gold's Gym incident on August 4, 2010. (R. 285:150.) The trial court also found that Mr. 
Herbert knew and recognized Ms. Butters, and that he knew or should have known that 
his conduct would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress. (R. 285:151.) 
In light of this evidence, the trial court ordered Mr. Herbert to pay a portion of Ms. 
Butters's attorneys'fees. 
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Mr. Herbert argues that attorney's fees are inappropriate, but provides no case law 
or argument support of his argument aside from conclusory statements that he contests the 
award. This does not meet the marshaling requirement. Further, the trial court provided 
ample justification for its award of attorneys' fees and did not abuse its discretion in 
awarding Ms. Butters her fees and costs. In fact, at oral argument on the issue of 
attorney's fees, while the trial court acknowledged that the standard is discretionary, that 
Ms. Butters prevailed, and that she was entitled to some attorney's fees, the trial court 
actually reduced Ms. Butters' award for attorney's fees from $19,889.50 to $9,837.00 (by 
interlineation) on the basis that the figure provided by Ms. Butters was excessive. (R. 
270; see also R. 286:15-16.) 
The award of attorney's fees in this matter is reasonable and justified and should 
be affirmed. And, as a prevailing party who was awarded attorney fees below, Ms. 
Butters should be awarded her attorneys' fees incurred in this appeal. See, e.g., Elman v. 
Elman, 2002 UT App 83,143, 45 P.3d 176. 
3R 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should dismiss Mr. Herbert's appeal, affirm 
the stalking injunction and attorneys' fees award from the district court, and award Ms. 
Butters her attorneys' fees incurred in this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of January 2012. 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, LC 
Stephen Quesenberry 
Jessica Griffin Anderson 
Mark R. Nelson 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellee 
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MICHAEL J. PETRO (4241) 
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO 
Attorneys for Respondent 
75 South 300 West 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: (801) 379-0700 , ; r 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TALEIMOANA WEINGARTEN, : 
STIPULATION 
Petitioner, : 
vs. * * 
Case No. 050402221 
NATHAN G. HERBERT, : Charges: 
Judge: 
Respondent. :. 
COMES NOW, the Petitioner, Talei Moana Weingarten, and her Attorney, Gregory G. 
Skordas, and the Respondent, Nathan Herbert and his Attorney, Michael L Petro of Young, 
Kester & Petro, and stipulate and agree that the Ex Parte Civil Stalking Injunction in this matter 
shall be modified and entered as a Civil Stalldng Injunction with the following provisions: 
1. The Respondent is enjoined from stalking the Petitioner, as defined in § §77-3a-
101, et eeq. and § 76-5-106.5 of the Utah Code Annotated. 
2. The Respondent shall be enjoined from going near the Peteitioner5 s 
residence at 973 East 1030 "North, Orem, Utah, or any other residence where Petitioner personally 
resides. . --•. 
3. •" Respondent is restrained form contacting the petitioner, directly or indirectly, 
through any form of communication including written, oral, or electronic means and the 
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Respondent is restrained form contacting the following persons: Sister - Aiona Butters, 
4. The Stalking Injunction shall remain in full force and effect for three years after 
the date of this agreement 
5. The parties stipulate that they have reviewed the provisions found herein, that they 
understand each and every provision herein, and that they agi'ee to be bound by the provisions 
herein. 
DATED this day of
 s 2005. 
NATHAN G. HERBERT 
Respondent 
DATED this day of , 2005. 
TALEIMOANA WHNGARTEN 
Petitioner 
DATED this day of
 t ,2005. 
MICHAEL LPETRO 
Attorney for Respondent 
DATED this day of , 2005. 
GREGORY G. SKORDAS 
Attorney for P etitioner 
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MICHAEL J. PETRO (4241) 
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO 
Attorneys for Resp ondent 
75 South 300 West 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: (801) 379-0700 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TALEI MO ANA WEINGARTEN, 
CIVIL STALKING INJUNCTION 
Petitioner, : 
-vs. * 
Case No, 050402221 
NATHAN G. HERBERT, : Charges: 
Judge: 
Respondent, ; 
This matter came on before the Court on the parties' stipulation. The Petitioner, Talei 
Moana Weingarten being represented by Gregory G. Skordas of Skordas, Caston & Miller and 
the Respondent, Nathan G. Herbert, being represented by Michael J, Petro of Young, Kester & 
Petro. The Court, having reviewed the file and being fully advised in the premises, an pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated 77-3a-101? et seq., now makes and enters the following: 
1. The Respondent is enjoined from stalking the Petitioner, as defined in §§77-3a-1015 
et seq. and § 76-5-106,5 of the Utah Code Annotated. 
2. The Respondent shall be enjoined from going near the Petitioner's residence at 
973 East 1030 North, Orem, Utah, or any other residence where Petitioner personally resides. 
3. Respondent is restrained form contacting the petitioner, directly or indirectly, 
through any form of communication including written, oral, or electronic means and the Respondent 
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IS restrained form contacting the following persons; Sister - Aiona Butters, 
4. The Stalking Injunction shall remain in fall force and effect for three years after 
the date of this agreement. 
DATED this day of , 2005, 
JUDGE 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
GMGORY G. SKORDAS 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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0 2007 
MICHAEL J. PETRO (42-N 
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO 
Attorneys for Defendant 
75 South 300 West 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: (801) 379-0700 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH. PROVO DEPARTMENT 
PROVO CITY, • : 
PLEA IN ABEYANCE 
Plaintiff, : 
v. : Case No. 051403891 & 051403892 
NATHAN HERBERT, : Judge Lynn W. Davis 
Defendant. : 
COMES NOW the plaintiff, by and through counsel, Rick Romney. Provo City-
Prosecutor, and the defendant. Nathan Herbert, by and through his attorney, Michael J. Petro, and 
subject to the approval of the Court, do hereby enter into the following Plea in Abeyance 
Agreement, and do covenant, promise and agree as follows: 
Plea Agreement 
Case No. 05-1403892 which charges Assault aQS^®j| |^gJne@.cSSIi :S|!g| 
|h'srr|t|sat upon Defendant's no contest plea in case no. 05-1403891 ^^L\f IN ftg-
Case No. 05-1403891 Tne defendant w i l l g ^ g ^ ^ f | s f | f b Violation of Stalf 
i CERTIFY THAT THi 
Injunction, a Class "A" Misdemeanor. AN ORIGINAL DOCi 
FOURTH JUDICIAL 
COUNTY, STATE Oi 
•/] pHtto. S^TJC* 
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Provo City v. Herbert, Case Nos. 05-1403891 & 05-1403892 
Pase 2 
1. After investigation concerning the offense charged, together with the defendants 
would be proper to enter into a plea in abeyance agreement for the previously mentioned count of 
Stalking, a Class "A" Misdemeanor. 
2. The parties, pursuant hereto, and subject to the approval of the Court, agrees to 
hold defendant's plea of guilty, in abeyance for a period of Twelve (12) months, from the date 
hereof upon the terms and conditions herein set forth. 
The defendant acknowledges that if the conditions and terms of this Plea in Abeyance 
Agreement are violated, the Provo City Prosecutor's Office, or the Court, on its own motion, may-
issue an order requiring the defendant to appear before the court at a designated time and place to 
show cause why the court should not find the terms of the agreement violated and why die 
agreement should not be terminated. IT following an evidentiary hearing, the court finds that me 
defendant has failed to substantially comply with any term or condition of the plea in abeyance 
agreement, it may terminate the agreement and enter judgment of conviction and impose 
sentence against the defendant for the offense to which the original plea was entered. 
. 3 . The defendant hereby represents that he/she has read and understands all of the 
provisions of this Plea in Abeyance Agreement and specifically agrees, promises and covenants 
to abide thereby. 
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Plea in Abeyance 
Provo City v. Herbert, Case Nos. 05-1403893 & 05-1403892 
Page3 
4. The defendant further represents thai he/she has the right, pursuant to Rule 22 of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, to be sentenced not less than two (2) nor more than forty 
five (45) days after the verdict or plea, and he/she specifically, hno^ingiy and mrelhgemiy 
waives the above said right. 
5. The defendant agrees that his/her guilty plea will be held in abeyance for a period 
of twelve (12) months and that during the duration of said time, the defendant specifically agrees 
to comply with the following terms and conditions: 
a. The defendant agrees that he/she shall not violate any municipal, 
county, state or federal laws, other than minor traffic offenses. 
b. The defendant agrees to report to the Court when requested. 
c. 'The defendant agrees that he will not change his permanent address 
without first notifying the Court. 
.^S^^^^^^^nty 
e. JSIllI^^ 
g S g D « ^ g M i ^ 9 9 No. Freedom Boulevard, Provo, Utah, telephone (801) 
373-1273. 
f. That the defendant shall complete any other requirements as may be agreed to 
between the parties. 
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Prove Ciry v. Herbert, Case Nos. 05-1403891 & 05-1403892 
Pa?e 4 
g. That the defendant shall have no coniact with the alleged victim or her immediate 
family members, either personally, through electronic or telephone means, or 
through any intermediary 
6. I§5pB^^ 
a g i e n ^ 
NATHAN G. HERBERT Date 
Defendant 
j/sUM. ^ f/otfo-?-
MICHAEL J. PETRO Date 
Attorney for Defendant 
&vk f^n-r^Ar\ f'~ ^- Ql 
RICKROMNEY /I Dare 
Provo City Prosecuio? 
Approval 
Based upon the motion of the plaintiff and defendant, and good cause appearing therefor: 
IT' IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above plea in abeyance agreement by approved by 
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Provo d ry v. Herbert. Case Nos. 05-I403S91 &. 05-1403892 
DATED this 
ement period to be for twelve (12) months. 
^-~"~"dav oi ^/yyi^^-^j^rr-. 
/L!$5N W. DAVIS 
District Court Judge 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
